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The Ambivalence of United States
Antrust Policy Toward SingkCountry
Export Cartels
Spencer Weber Waller*
The cornerstone of United States antitrust policy has been its coher-
ent and effective attack on domestic cartel behavior. Following a period
of ambiguity in the early twentieth century over the requirements for
prohibiting joint activity by competitors,' price fixing and other forms of
cartel behavior have been held to be per se unreasonable for nearly fifty
years,' and have been subjected to intensive governmental scrutiny via
the grand jury process and criminal prosecution. Today such behavior
will be rewarded by the almost certain application of criminal sanctions
and imprisonment.
The evolution of U.S. antitrust law against international cartels and
cartel activities conducted outside the United States has had a more com-
plicated history. Originally, it was held that U.S. antitrust law simply
did not apply to conduct outside the United States.' The law soon ap-
plied substantive U.S. antitrust standards to cartel activities where at
least some conduct occurred within the United States.4 Ultimately, the
law evolved away from a tortured search for conduct within our borders
and came to encompass anticompetitive conduct which was both in-
* Freeborn & Peters, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. University of Michigan; J.D. Northwestern Uni-
versity. With appreciation and gratitude to Professor Rahl.
1 Compare Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) and Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) with United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927).
2 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
3 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1909).
4 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927).
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tended to have and actually did have an effect on the United States.5
In the international context, the cartel remains the primary target of
both public and private antitrust enforcement. Despite the multitude of
writings and the failure to articulate a single standard for U.S. jurisdic-
tion over anticompetitive conduct abroad,6 there would appear to be vir-
tual unanimity that a cartel composed of private firms in several nations
acting without the home country's approval or compulsion would be sub-
ject to the full range of antitrust scrutiny if its conduct had a direct,
substantial, and foreseeable effect on the economy of the United States or
on U.S. consumers. Indeed, the shining success of U.S. antitrust law in
the post-War era has been the virtual elimination of the explicit formal
international cartel aimed at the United States.7
The very success of these enforcement efforts has led to two develop-
ments which run counter to the interests of traditional U.S. antitrust en-
forcement. First, as the true international cartel has faded, in its place
has arisen a growing emphasis on export cartels composed of manufac-
turers or exporters from a single country. Second, to a great extent, the
truly private cartel has been replaced by anticompetitive conduct by pub-
lic or quasi-public entities either directed or compelled by their home
governments.
U.S. antitrust law has a comparatively poor history of responding to
the challenges posed by single-country export cartels. The U.S. response
to single-country export cartels has stemmed from a perceived distinction
made between the true international cartel and the single-country export
cartel. While the United States has been willing to pursue antitrust in-
vestigations of true international cartels, even at the risk of alienating its
closest trading partners,' it has shown considerable temerity in investi-
gating single-country export cartels.
A portion of this distinction stems from the real world consequences
of single-country export cartels calling into play the economic, political,
and foreign relations interests of the United States, and the differing fac-
tors behind the creation of each cartel. Purely private cartels are primar-
ily motivated by a desire to maximize profits. To accomplish this goal,
private cartels coordinate prices and output, deter cheating by cartel
5 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (on certification
and transfer from the United States Supreme Court for lack of quorum).
6 See Simon and Waller, A Theory of Economic Sovereignty: An Alternative to Extraterritorial
Jurisdictional Disputes, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 337 (1986).
7 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION AND
TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACTION 28-29 (1984).
8 Prominent examples of such investigations include the uranium investigation of the 1970s,
and the Laker Airways and Ocean Shipping investigations of the 1980s.
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members, and attempt to avoid detection from antitrust enforcement.
When a foreign government is involved in the creation or implementa-
tion of a single-country export cartel, however, profit maximization may
be only one of many goals being pursued by the cartel.
Such a cartel may simply be a twentieth century extension of mer-
cantilist trade policies designed to exploit foreign markets for the benefit
of national producers. On the other hand, a single-country export cartel
may be used by the home government to effectuate domestic economic
policies, promote employment in export sectors, obtain hard currency
from abroad, or implement international agreements and understandings
ranging from the prevention of dumping and countervailing duties to the
resolution of international trade disputes through voluntary export re-
straints implemented through an export cartel.
The United States has never confronted the competitive issues raised
by single-country export cartels in anything other than a contradictory,
ambivalent, and conflicting manner. The inability of the United States to
formulate a coherent response to this prevalent form of cartel behavior is
exacerbated by the United States' use of both the Webb-Pomerene Act
and the Export Trading Company Act to allow the creation of export
associations which may themselves constitute export cartels. The inco-
herence of U.S. policy in this area has hurt the United States in its efforts
both to prohibit those foreign export cartels which have anticompetitive
consequences in the United States, and to persuade foreign states to
abandon their support for such export cartels.
The treatment of single-country export cartels differently and more
favorably than traditional international cartels is based on a dangerous
and false distinction. This Article describes the failure of the United
States to articulate clear and convincing reasons for its tolerance of
single-country export cartels and suggests that the only real distinction
among any collaborative behavior between competitors is whether the
results of the collaboration are pro- or anti-competitive.
I. U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE FOREIGN SINGLE-COUNTRY
EXPORT CARTEL
Ironically, the current U.S. antitrust enforcement policy against for-
eign single-country export cartels stands in contrast to the early success
of the Sherman Act in combatting national export cartels.9 By the 1970s,
U.S. policy in this area had degenerated into sporadic and conflicting
9 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Deutsches Kal-
isyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1929).
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enforcement priorities. The harshest treatment came in the mid-1970s,
when a criminal indictment was brought against an export association of
Korean wig manufacturers.1 0 The indictment charged the association
with conspiring to violate the Sherman Act, despite evidence showing
that association members represented no more than 20% of a declining
market, and that their efforts had little if any effect on price.
Virtually at the same time, Assistant Attorney General Baker stated
in a letter to Congress:
We have generally followed for some years a policy against suing members
of a foreign export association for conduct which the United States would
permit under the Webb-Pomerene Act. We have on a number of occasions
investigated whether foreign exporters have engaged in conduct, such as
international market allocation or customer allocation within the United
States, which would be beyond our Webb-Pomerene exemption and which
might also be in excess of what they were specifically authorized to do or
could be legitimately authorized to do by their governments. Besides the
obvious policy and equity factors favoring this approach, we have also been
influenced by questions of practicality and efficient resource allocation. It
has seemed likely to us that if a foreign government is committed to the
idea of controlled exports, it could probably achieve such control through
direct state involvement, a liberal merger or joint venture policy, or some
form of mandatory system. In light of this, it seems quite probable that if
we were to sue a foreign export association, arguing that governmental au-
thorization was an insufficient defense, the ultimate result of such a suit
might well be continuation of the same conduct in even a more rigid form,
as well as foreign policy controversy."
In 1977, the same year as the Baker letter, the Department of Justice
published its Antitrust Guide for International Operations ("1977 Anti-
trust Guide") which seemed to contradict the Baker comments.12
Although the 1977Antitrust Guide suggested different, and perhaps more
lenient, substantive rules for international conduct, it strongly challenged
the notion of deference to governmental acquiescence in export arrange-
ments. In a variety of contexts, the 1977 Antitrust Guide took a very
narrow view of the act of state doctrine and the foreign sovereign com-
pulsion doctrine and suggested that only the clearest mandatory export
arrangements aimed at the U.S. market would survive antitrust scrutiny.
In 1981, Assistant Attorney General Baxter suggested that the
10 United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass'n, No. 74 CR 622, No. 75 Civ. 3069 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
11 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Donald Baker to Senator Edward Kennedy (Feb. 16,
1977), reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 274, at 15-16 (Mar. 29, 1977).
12 Department of Justice, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 50-57 (1977),
reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (1977)[hereinafter 1977 ANTI-
TRUST GUIDE].
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United States would investigate and prosecute single-country export car-
tels and encouraged foreign governments to do the same. In a speech to
the American Bar Association, Baxter stated, "Our government does not
require the formation of export cartels, or actively supervise them as in-
struments of our national policy. Assuming that other nations had simi-
lar laws, we would consider it appropriate to prosecute similarly formed
private cartels aimed at our market place."' 3
Most recently, the Department of Justice in 1988 issued a draft ver-
sion of a new Antitrust Guide for International Operations ("Draft Guide-
lines"), which suggests an even stricter line policy against single-country
export cartels. The Draft Guidelines explicitly repudiate any difference
in substantive rules to be applied in the international context which may
have been suggested by the earlier guidelines. 1. The Draft Guidelines
even take the unprecedented step of suggesting that, while the govern-
ment will consider the role of a foreign government in the investigation
of an anticompetitive restraint, the Department of Justice does not recog-
nize the act of state doctrine or the foreign compulsion doctrine as valid
defenses in cases actually brought by the government.' 5 In addition, the
Draft Guidelines add a new hypothetical case study which indicates that
a cartel arrangement formed by domestic and foreign producers under
the guise of settling an import relief case would represent a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.
16
The final version of the Guide published in late 1988 suggests that
the defense of foreign compulsion would be recognized as a legal defense
but continues to define the defense in very narrow terms. 1' However, the
1988 Guide continues to insist that general considerations of comity
would not bar any suit where the United States has brought suit. 8
Despite its aggressive rhetoric, the Department of Justice has not
initiated any new cases aimed at the activities of single-country export
cartels in recent years. Its latest enforcement venture constituted a 1982
consent decree aimed at a Japanese buying cartel accused of depressing
the price of U.S. exports of Tanner Crab from Alaska. 9
13 W. Baxter, Remarks before the ABA International Law Section in Washington, D.C., Anti-
trust in an Interdependent World (Sept. 29, 1981.)
14 Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,584
(1988) [hereinafter Draft Guidelines].
15 Id. at 21,596 n.118.
16 Id. at 21,616-17.
17 Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, 109.10, at 20,613-14 (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Antitrust Guidelines].
18 Id. at 20,612.




Furthermore, private antitrust enforcement has not filled the gap to
create a uniform policy aimed at single-country export cartels. The
Zenith20 case represented the most significant opportunity in private liti-
gation to resolve questions in this area. In Zenith, the plaintiffs attacked
the conduct of a Japanese export association for televisions and other
consumer electronic products, contending that the Japanese television in-
dustry had engaged in a lengthy conspiracy to monopolize the U.S. mar-
ket through concerted price cutting, dumping, and actual predation.
After fourteen years of pre-trial proceedings, the Supreme Court dis-
missed the case for lack of proof of an anticompetitive conspiracy,
thereby passing up an opportunity to make law in this vital area. The
lack of direct evidence in support of the plaintiffs' claims, and the range
of economic evidence presented by the defendants that the alleged con-
spiracy was economically irrational, led the Court to assume that the
alleged conspiracy did not exist.
II. THE UNITED STATES' USE OF EXPORT CARTELS
The attitude of the United States toward the legality of export car-
tels is further complicated by the existence of long-standing exemptions
to U.S. antitrust law which permit joint and collaborative activities be-
tween competitors in the export market which otherwise would be per s
unreasonable and unlawful if engaged in by competitors in domestic
commerce. While U.S. law is essentially permissive, the net effect is the
creation, via legislation, of a statutory vehicle for U.S. firms to form law-
ful export cartels. The United States has permitted export associations-
pursuant to the Webb-Pomerene Act 21 on an uninterrupted basis since
1918. In addition, perceived substantive and procedural weaknesses in
the Webb-Pomerene Act led Congress to pass the Export Trading Com-
pany Act2 2 in 1982, and to restrict further U.S. jurisdiction over export
activities pursuant to the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 3
of the same year. The Department of Justice generally has read these
exemptions narrowly, and has often opposed them as antithetical to the
antitrust philosophy of the United States. Nevertheless, both the Webb-
Pomerene Act and the Export Trading Company Act have been widely
approved by policymakers eager to address growing U.S. trade imbal-
ances and placate the fears in the business community that restrictive
20 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
21 The Webb-Pomerene Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982).
22 The Export Trading Company Act of 1982 is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982).
23 The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3)
(1982).
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antitrust laws have hampered the ability of U.S. businesses to compete
with foreign firms not subject to the same restrictions.
From the cartelist's point of view, the Webb-Pomerene Act has not
been a significant advancement. Only a limited number of Webb-
Pomerene associations currently exist, and their ability to cartelize and
exploit export markets has been hampered by the reporting requirements
of the Webb-Pomerene Act, the limitation of Webb-Pomerene associa-
tions to trade in commodities rather than services, ambiguous case law,
and past Department of Justice prosecutions of members of Webb-
Pomerene associations which have exceeded the scope of the Act's pro-
tection. The hostility toward the activities of Webb-Pomerene associa-
tions and the narrow construction of that Act were reflected in the
Department of Justice's 1977 Antitrust Guide, which stated that the De-
partment would continue to prosecute anticompetitive export activity
which had a significant spillover effect into the domestic economy or
which significantly foreclosed export opportunities of U.S. nationals.
The Export Trading Company Act and the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act broadened the opportunity for collusive behavior of
U.S. firms in export markets in two significant ways. First, the Export
Trading Company Act provided a vehicle for joint export activity by fur-
nishing significant immunities and limitations from the reach of U.S. an-
titrust law upon application and approval by the Department of
Commerce and the Department of Justice. Second, the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act codified jurisdictional limits protecting ex-
port restrictions from U.S. antitrust jurisdiction for collusive export ac-
tivities, unless there was a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect on
U.S. import commerce. This attitude is reflected in the Department of
Justice's 1988 Antitrust Guidelines, which state that the Department's
sole enforcement concern will be the potential "spillover" effect of any
export restraints on the U.S. domestic economy. 24
The precise limits of the Export Trading Company Act on the pro-
motion of U.S. export cartels remain unclear. The process of disclosure
implicit in the application and approval requirements of the Act may
well deter potential cartelists from using it as a vehicle for their export
activities. In addition, applicants for export trading company certificates
of review remain subject to the conflicting bureaucratic interests of the
Department of Commerce in the promotion of exports, and the Depart-
ment of Justice in the enforcement of competition goals. Accordingly, of
24 1988 Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 17, at 21,610. In contrast, the 1977 ANTITRUST GUIDE,
supra note 12, at 7, sets forth the Department of Justice's former policy of also condemning export
restraints which foreclosed significant U.S. export markets and opportunity.
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the approximately ninety export trading company certificates of review
previously issued, few of the certificates appear to cover actual collusive
activities among competitors. To date, the Department of Justice has
brought no cases attacking the activities of export trading companies,
25
and it apparently has no interest in further scrutinizing export restraints,
except for those limited circumstances of bid rigging and price fixing in
connection with the purchase of U.S. sponsored or subsidized foreign aid
destined for export abroad.26
The conflict between U.S. policy aimed against restraints on imports
into the United States and the permissiveness of antitrust policy with
respect to the jurisdictional and substantive legal limits on collusive ex-
port activity from the United States is best illustrated in Daishowa Inter-
national v. North Coast Export Co. 7 The Daishowa case concerned the
activities of several U.S. wood chip manufacturers which formed a
Webb-Pomerene export association in 1974. In the same year, the U.S.
association entered into a contract to sell wood chips to Daishowa, a
Japanese paper producer. Daishowa instituted a breach of contract ac-
tion in federal court following a repudiation of the price term of the
wood chip contract. In the course of discovery, the U.S. association un-
covered evidence of a potential conspiracy between Daishowa and other
major Japanese paper manufacturers to offset the association's market
power. The U.S. association counterclaimed against the Japanese pur-
chasers on the theory that the Japanese purchasers had been operating as
a monopsony, fixing the price for export wood chips and boycotting the
U.S. association for failure to accept their trading conditions.
In its reply, Daishowa moved to strike the antitrust counterclaims
on the grounds that Daishowa was entitled to an implied reciprocal ex-
emption from U.S. antitrust law for cooperative conduct with other Japa-
nese purchasers in transactions with an exempt Webb-Pomerene
association. Daishowa further argued that the doctrine of comity
presented alternative grounds for dismissing the antitrust claims for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The court's decision to let the antitrust
counterclaims stand suggests that U.S. antitrust law insists that foreign
exporters or purchasers act competitively in the international market,
25 The principal private antitrust litigation relating to Export Trading Companies has been lim-
ited to an examination of the procedures for approving an application for a certificate of review.
Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldridge, 811 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1987).
26 United States v. Concentrated Phosphates Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968); United States v.
Standard Tallow Corp., 1988-1 Trade Case (CCH) 67,913 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1988) (consent
decree).
27 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774 (1982).
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while U.S. Webb-Pomerene and export trading company laws permit
U.S. exporters to act collusively in the same markets.
The principal limitations on the conduct of Webb-Pomerene as-
sociations and export trading companies are not found in U.S. law at all,
but rather in the competition laws of other countries adversely affected
by the activities of the U.S. export restraints. The European Economic
Community ("EEC") recently provided the first test of the principal that
neither the Webb-Pomerene Act, nor the Export Trading Company Act
will provide the U.S. participants with any immunity from foreign com-
petition laws. In the Wood Pulp case,28 the European Commission inves-
tigated and prosecuted the activities of an international cartel of wood
pulp producers, which included the members of a U.S. Webb-Pomerene
association. Despite lobbying from the U.S. wood pulp producers, the
United States did not publicly or actively intervene in the European
Commission's investigation or prosecution. Ultimately, the European
Court of Justice found that the U.S. members of the Webb-Pomerene
association had infringed the competition provisions of the Treaty of
Rome through concerted action with respect to the price of wood pulp
sold in the EEC, but interestingly enough absolved the U.S. Webb-
Pomerene association of wrongdoing.
III. EXPORT CARTELS AS A TOOL OF UNITED STATES
TRADE POLICY
The final complication comes in the U.S. government's promotion of
arrangements conducive to foreign single country export cartels as a
mechanism for resolving certain bilateral trade disputes. Beginning in
the 1960s, the executive branch has negotiated and promoted a series of
voluntary restraint agreements and voluntary export restraints as a
means of solving certain intractable and politically sensitive trade
problems. The executive branch turned to voluntary export restraints as
an alternative to inflexible congressional quotas which would have been
damaging to both U.S. economic interests and foreign policy concerns.
As the executive branch has gained experience in negotiating and imple-
menting voluntary export restraints, the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice has been placed in the unusual and difficult position
of defending the antitrust consequences of administration trade policy.
In addition, the Antitrust Division often has guided foreign governments
and producers so that the export restraints can be implemented while




minimizing the fear of antitrust prosecution or private treble damage
litigation.
The implementation of three particular voluntary restraint agree-
ments illustrates this increasing sophistication. In the late 1960s, increas-
ing foreign imports threatened the steel industry. In anticipation of
certain congressional action which would have established stringent quo-
tas for imported steel, the U.S. government concluded a series of volun-
tary export restraints with European steel producers. While negotiating
these voluntary restraint agreements for steel, the U.S. government by-
passed their governmental counterparts, and instead held meetings di-
rectly with foreign steel producers and accepted letters of intent from
foreign private producers addressed to the U.S. State Department.
Under these voluntary restraint agreements, the State Department moni-
tored compliance with the terms set forth in the letters of intent. Ulti-
mately, the voluntary restraint agreements were expanded and
strengthened to include producers of approximately 85% of the steel im-
ported into the United States.
The U.S. government's negotiations with private producers were ul-
timately challenged in court, but were upheld in Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. Rogers.29 The plaintiff in Consumers Union charged
that the executive branch and the individual governmental officials nego-
tiating the steel agreements had acted beyond the scope of their delegated
powers, and that the resulting agreements constituted aper se violation of
the Sherman Act. The plaintiff further contended that the existing con-
gressional trade legislation had preempted the president's powers in the
field and constituted the sole mechanism for relief against imports. Ulti-
mately, the plaintiff dismissed the antitrust portion of its claim, and the
case was submitted on cross-motions for summary judgment as to the
president's authority in the field of international trade.
The district court upheld the steel agreements, concluding that
nothing in the existing trade legislation preempted the president's au-
thority in the field of foreign affairs. The court noted that the president,
although authorized to negotiate voluntary limitations on steel imports,
had no authority to give assurances of immunity from antitrust liability
to any private person or firm participating in the voluntary restraint
agreements. Upon appeal, the decision was affirmed with the court rely-
ing on the "precatory" nature of the voluntary restraints, which were
characterized as mere letters of intent lacking binding effect on the Con-
gress or the executive branch.
29 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom, Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Keeping in mind the lessons of Consumers Union, the executive
branch approached the trade crisis involving automobiles from Japan in
the early 1980s in a significantly different fashion."0 Following an unsuc-
cessful attempt by domestic manufacturers to limit Japanese imports
pursuant to Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, the Carter administra-
tion concluded that it required a specific grant of authority from Con-
gress as a prerequisite to negotiating with the Japanese government.
Against a background of proposed legislation which would have estab-
lished formal quotas, the Reagan administration conducted a series of
meetings with Japanese officials to resolve the crisis.
The solution came in the form of an announcement by the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"). MITI an-
nounced what it described as a unilateral action, creating a system of
quotas which would restrict the number of Japanese automobiles enter-
ing the United States. The Japanese ministry issued directives as to the
number of automobiles to be exported. The manufacturers were required
to submit reports to the Japanese government of their exports for a deter-
mination of whether any manufacturer had exceeded the limits set forth
in the government directives. The MITI announcement contained
threats that mandatory export licensing would be instituted in the event
of any violation of the export ceilings.
Shortly after this announcement, the Japanese government submit-
ted a formal letter to the United States setting forth the voluntary export
restraint and the legislative basis for each of the enactments under Japa-
nese law. In response, Attorney General Smith accepted the assertion
that MITI had the authority to enforce the quotas under Japanese law
and concluded, "in these circumstances we believe that the Japanese au-
tomobile companies' compliance with export limitations directed by
MITI would properly be viewed as having been compelled by the Japa-
nese government, acting within its sovereign powers." On this basis, the
letter concluded that the export restraints would not give rise to viola-
tions of U.S. antitrust law.
Most recently, the U.S. government issued similar assurances to the
Japanese government in connection with the creation and implementa-
tion of an agreement limiting the price and quantity of semiconductors
exported from Japan to the United States in connection with the settle-
ment of dumping proceedings brought by U.S. manufacturers. This most
recent voluntary export restraint may be on the firmest footing, in terms
of the executive branch's authority under both the trade laws and anti-
30 See generally Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust Law: The
Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747 (1982).
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trust laws, with all parties concerned acting in compliance with the sub-
stantive and procedural requirements for the suspension of dumping
cases under U.S. trade laws.
Although the legality of such ad hoc arrangements and other similar
voluntary restraints under the trade and antitrust laws is by no means a
settled issue, the executive branch has continued to issue similar comfort
letters to foreign governments which have adopted voluntary export re-
straints at the request or urging of the United States. In addition, the
1988 Antitrust Guidelines have added a new hypothetical case that explic-
itly exempts private parties who comply with governmentally negotiated
voluntary export restraints.31
The implied immunities for the creation of voluntary export re-
straints pursuant to the mechanisms set forth in U.S. trade law and the
substantive defenses provided by the act of state doctrine and the foreign
sovereign compulsion doctrine have combined to give the executive
branch a powerful tool for resolving certain trade disputes. As a result,
however, the role and nature of the Antitrust Division in the field of
international commerce has changed from that of investigator and prose-
cutor to that of counselor and advisor to the president for the execution
of agreements motivated by concerns other than the enforcement of com-
petition policy. The widespread use of such agreements also raises the
danger that foreign firms acting under the umbrella of voluntary restraint
agreements will enter into collateral agreements allocating quotas and
customers, thereby creating additional anticompetitive consequences be-
yond those imposed by their governments.
IV. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF SINGLE-COUNTRY EXPORT CARTELS
Apart from the question of governmental attitudes toward the exist-
ence of export cartels aimed at the United States, there are a variety of
considerations which increase the difficulty of detecting, investigating,
and prosecuting or litigating against foreign single-country export car-
tels. Such export activity is typically difficult to detect because of the
lack of empirical evidence and public information regarding foreign gov-
ernmental policies. Most countries simply take the position that their
own competition laws do not extend to export activities, and as a result,
require little or no reporting of export cartels. For countries that are
members of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment ("OECD"), only Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
31 1988 Draft Guidelines, supra note 17, 12,109.95, at 20,641.
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United States have mechanisms for registering export agreements.32
Even this data can be deceiving given the fact that there may be no re-
quirement of compulsory notification when export agreements are aban-
doned and no requirements for reporting export cartels or agreements
which do not include any restrictions on domestic commerce. Informa-
tion about export cartels for other OECD countries is very limited and is
almost non-existent for countries outside of the organization.33
The lack of transparency in governmental policies toward export
cartels is exacerbated by the fact that in most cases, the prime actors and
evidence are located abroad and are seldom subject to traditional detec-
tion and discovery mechanisms provided for in U.S. governmental inves-
tigations and private litigation. In addition, one would expect that
members of a single-country export cartel aimed at the United States
would have greater homogeneity and common business and cultural tra-
ditions. Such homogeneity makes the operation of the cartel even more
effective and less subject to cheating, defection, and detection. Moreover,
single-country export cartel activity may be too sophisticated for U.S.
consumers to detect and too expensive for them to litigate. While the
middlemen and importers may be in the best position to take action
against such collusive behavior, they may also have the strongest incen-
tive not to do so for fear of retaliation and boycotts by the producers
upon whom they depend.
The final set of hurdles for an antitrust enforcer fighting against
single-country export cartels consists of the international jurisdictional
considerations and substantive defenses which apply in the areas of for-
eign commerce antitrust. A successful plaintiff will have to come for-
ward with evidence demonstrating a substantial effect on U.S. commerce
to meet the varying formulations of subject matter jurisdiction under the
variety of comity and interest balancing requirements in use by the fed-
eral courts. In addition, the plaintiff will have to obtain personal juris-
diction over the corporations or individuals involved in the export
restraints aimed at the U.S. market.
If the export cartel represents more than just the private anti-
competitive conduct of private individuals, the plaintiff will have to con-
front the possible application of the act of state doctrine or the foreign
compulsion defense, which may cause a U.S. court either to abstain from
accepting jurisdiction or to immunize the conduct in question. Finally,
32 OECD COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, EXPORT CARTELS
22-24 (1974).




the court must take into account the existence of foreign blocking stat-
utes if the plaintiff is relying upon discovery mechanisms for obtaining
the evidence to prove an antitrust violation.
V. TOWARDS A CoNsIsTENT ENFORCEMENT POLICY
While the impediments to consistent enforcement of antitrust stan-
dards against all export cartels are formidable, the incentives are signifi-
cant as well. There is no economic distinction between cartel activities
on the basis of national origin. A single-country export cartel with mar-
ket power over a particular commodity poses the same threat to U.S.
consumers as an international cartel with the same control over produc-
tion and price. If the market power of the cartel or the level of its im-
ports is de minimus with regard to the United States, the cartel may well
escape scrutiny due to the limits of U.S. jurisdiction or due to the deci-
sions of government and private litigants not to invest scarce legal re-
sources. However, there is no economic or legal basis for excluding a
cartel from the application of U.S. antitrust law simply because its par-
ticipants share a common nationality or country of origin.
Furthermore, the potential that a foreign government has knowl-
edge of or is involved in an export association is not sufficient cause for a
de facto exemption. To automatically equate the existence of an export
cartel with a favorable national policy is a serious mistake. The home
nation of the export cartel may be anything from wildly enthusiastic to
overtly hostile to the idea of export cartels in general or to the existence
of a particular cartel. For example, at one extreme, certain countries will
formally or informally require exporters to participate in price or quan-
tity restrictions. However, other countries merely permit the existence of
such cartels and are neutral towards their operation. Other countries,
while not affirmatively condoning the existence of export cartels, find
that their own national competition laws do not apply to pure export
restrictions. Finally, a given export cartel may be illegal or may exceed
the bounds of its lawful existence and be subject to civil or criminal con-
sequences in its own country. Deference to a foreign governmental com-
mand to firms engaged in export activity may be appropriate in a
particular case, but it is only one factor to take into account in formulat-
ing U.S. antitrust policy, and it is not grounds alone for a special and
specious exemption.
The idea of the notification and registration of export cartels on an
international basis is equally tempting but flawed. Transparency is a val-
ued goal, but it is of use, first and foremost, as a tool in the detection and
eradication of anticompetitive restraints and should not be used as a jus-
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tification for their perpetuation.34 The creation of a special exemption
for notified export cartels aimed at the United States would require a
wholesale rewriting of the Sherman Act in a manner providing foreign
cartelists with a politically impractical advantage over their domestic
lawbreaking counterparts. Finally, the legitimization of a system of com-
peting national export cartels would represent a return to dangerous
forms of mercantilism and beggar-thy-neighbor policies which have long
since been abandoned in the field of international trade and should not be
resurrected in the guise of antitrust policy.
Even on a cynical level, such a notion does not necessarily benefit
the United States. There is no reason to think that U.S. export cartels
are better or more effective than those of other nations. In fact, it would
appear that the United States would be a net loser in such a game. With
the United States comprising less than one-third of global economic ac-
tivity, the limited monopoly rents extracted by U.S. export cartels in all
likelihood would be greatly outweighed by the accompanying harm to
U.S. consumers.
The likely spillover effects of U.S. export cartels in the domestic
economy make this trade-off even less attractive. The internationaliza-
tion of the economy suggests that U.S. export cartels with the ability to
restrict production and price in export markets eventually will adversely
affect the U.S. economy as well. U.S. consumers are the biggest losers, if
the facilitation of traditional domestic cartels through information ex-
changes among producers of homogenous goods is factored into the
equation.
The response to collusion and anticompetitive behavior is more en-
forcement rather than less enforcement. The United States, after awak-
ening the world to the need for competition law and the dangers of
cartels, has resurrected such behavior under a national rather than an
international guise. Concerns over the proper limits of jurisdiction are
appropriate, as is the need for sensitivity to the mandatory commands of
foreign states within their legitimate spheres. However, none of these
factors mandates or even suggests the abandonment of the United States
as a vigilant policeman where cartel conduct adversely affects the inter-
ests of U.S. producers and consumers. If the watchword of the new anti-
trust learning is indeed economics, then the negative economic effects of
a cartel remain the paramount concern of U.S. antitrust law, regardless
of nationality.
34 The experience of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in achieving greater trans-




There is nothing inconsistent about the vigorous promotion of com-
petition and a sensible recognition of the legal and practical limits of
national jurisdiction and enforcement power. The inconsistency arises
when jurisdictional limits become an excuse for the promotion of cartels
aimed abroad. This inconsistency injures both the credibility of U.S.
competition policy and the will of the United States to enforce its laws.
The real prospect for a successful U.S. competition policy has been
the promotion of competition law itself. A community of vigilant anti-
trust enforcers represents the best hope for the reduction of all cartels.
The adoption of international codes relating to competition issues,
whether they are themselves effective and binding legal regimes, have ad-
ded legitimacy to the international application of national competition
codes. The legitimization of competition law and its spread among the
industrialized and newly industrialized nations holds out the prospect of
a mutually reinforcing check on all cartel behavior. Cases like the EEC's
Wood Pulp, and governmental actions like the United States' principled
and balanced response to the Wood Pulp decision constitute the best hope
that the national export cartel will eventually join its discredited cousin,
the traditional international cartel, as an improper distortion of competi-
tion in international trade subject to universal condemnation and
prohibition.
